Over the last couple of months the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (published in February 2007) has been at the centre of a media storm. Revaluations about exaggerated or groundless claims have called into question the reputation of an organisation that has assumed a mantle of scientific invincibility during the last three years.

Alarmist predictions about the future of Himalayan glaciers, the Amazon rain forests, agricultural production in Africa, increasing devastation caused extreme weather events and rising sea levels have been shown to be based on evidence that at best is anything but robust and at worst is no more than hearsay. Worse still, it seems that the authors of the report were aware of the shortcomings of the evidence they were relying on but used it anyway.

Publication on the Internet of over a thousand emails from the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, now known as Climategate, has added to disquiet about the IPCC’s activities.  They suggest that Professor Phil Jones and many other leading climate scientists have attempted to subvert the accepted standards of their profession in order to protect their research findings from criticism. Many of those involved have been extremely influential within the IPCC process and the emails reveal an unhealthy culture of hostility towards anyone who questions the orthodox view of climate change that this organisation represents. It is questionable whether objective scientific research can take place under such circumstances.

The effect on the IPCC’s reputation, and that of its chairman Dr Rajendra Pachauri, has been devastating, but at every stage of this scandal we have been assured that the core science underpinning concern about anthropogenic climate change has remained unscathed. The IPCC and its supporters have been able to undertake this damage limitation exercise because attention so far has focused on only one of the three sections of the most recent assessment report: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.  This deals with the symptoms and perceived consequences of climate change. The core scientific evidence that the climate is changing and that human influence is playing a part in this is contained  in another section of the report, Working Group I: Climate Change 2007: the Physical Basis.  But can we be confident that the same problems of sloppy authorship and exaggeration do not extend to this part of the IPCC’s assessment too?

On page 8 of the Working Group I: Summary for Policymakers there is a table (SPM.2) that has the following snappy title:

Recent trends, assessment of human influence on the trend and projections for extreme weather events for which there is an observed late-20th century trend.

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf

Extreme weather events are a particularly potent weapon in the battle to win hearts and minds for the crusade against climate change. Hurricanes (cyclones), droughts, floods and heat waves all feature as dramatic news stories regularly; they are the stuff of which editor’s dreams are made. A combination of dramatic pictures and human interest assures them a place in the headlines, and on the front pages, whenever there is an excuse for publishing them. From the point of view of those who wish to promote the idea of anthropogenic global warming such stories present a wonderful opportunity. If extreme weather events can be linked to catastrophic climate change in the public consciousness then the message that humans are influencing the climate, with appalling consequences, is going to be reinforced repeatedly because hardly a month goes by without some kind of weather related disaster being reported.

This is what Table SPM.2 says:

[A]

Phenomenon aand direction of trend

[B]

Likelihood that trend occurred in late 20th century (typically post 1960)

 

[C]

Likelihood of a human contribution to observed trend b

[D]

Likelihood of future trends based on projections for 21st century using SRES scenarios

[1] Warmer and fewer cold daysand nights over most landareas

Very likely c

[>90%]

Likely e

>60%

Virtually certain e

>99%

[2] Warmer and more frequenthot days and nights overmost land areas

Very likely d

>90%

Likely (nights) e

>60%

Virtually certain e

>99%

[3] Warm spells / heat waves.Frequency increases overmost land areas

Likely

>60%

More likely than not f

>50%

Very likely

>90%

[4] Heavy precipitation events.Frequency (or proportion oftotal rainfall from heavy falls)increases over most areas

Likely

>60%

More likely than not f

>50%

Very likely

>90%

[5] Area affected by droughtsincreases

Likely in many regions

since 1970s

>60%

More likely than not

>50%

Likely

>60%

[6] Intense tropical cycloneactivity increases

Likely in some regions

since 1970

>60%

More likely than not f

>50%

Likely

>60%

[7] Increased incidence ofextreme high sea level(excludes tsunamis) g

Likely

>60%

More likely than not f, h

>50%

Likely I

>60%

For ease of reference I’ve made a few additions to this table in square brackets.  The columns are now labelled  A-D and the rows 1-7. I’ve also added numerical values for probabilities (‘likelihood’). These are explained briefly in a footnote on page 3 of the Summary for Policymakers, and in more detail in Box TS.1 in the Technical Summary of Working  Group I as follows:

Likelihood Terminology Likelihood of the occurrence/ outcome
Virtually certain > 99% probability
Extremely likely > 95% probability
Very likely > 90% probability
Likely > 66% probability
More likely than not > 50% probability
About as likely as not 33 to 66% probability
Unlikely < 33% probability
Very unlikely < 10% probability
Extremely unlikely < 5% probability
Exceptionally unlikely < 1% probability

If we  look at row [3]  in Table SPM.2 for example, which deals with heat waves, we find the following:

Column A describes a phenomenon and a trend: heatwaves becoming more frequent.

Column B assesses the ‘likelihood’ that this trend has been confirmed by observation: is there empirical scientific evidence that heatwaves have become more frequent?

Column C introduces a hypothesis: if a trend in the frequency of heat waves has been observed then human activity is contributing to that trend. The likelihood of this being true is assessed.

Column D considers a prediction about the trend – increasing frequency of heat waves – continuing during the rest of the 21st century. This prediction is based on a range of scenarios set out in the SPM from Page 18 onwards. All of these envisage a world in which the fraction of Co2 in the atmosphere is growing as a result of human activity with a consequent rise in global temperatures exceeding any natural variation that can be expected.

In terms of the scientific method, we start with an assumption in Column [A]; heatwaves are increasing. This is then tested by observation in Column [B]: is it possible to detect an increase in the number of heatwaves, particularly during the last fifty years? A hypothesis follows in Column [C]: if it can be shown that there has been an increase in the number of heat waves, then anthropogenic warming has contributed to this. Finally, in Column [D], there is a prediction that depends on the preceding columns.

If we now look at the levels of ‘likelihood’ that the IPCC have assigned in each column we find something really quite remarkable. There is only a 60% – 89% chance that the frequency of heat waves have in fact increased; this leaves significant room for doubt that any such trend exists. There is even less confidence (50% – 59%) that, if an increase in heat waves has occurred – and we’re not sure it has – then human activity has something to do with it.

The conclusion that the IPCC draws from this is that, although there is a significant level of uncertainty as to whether the frequency of heat waves has increased during the last half century, and there is even more uncertainty as to whether, if the frequency has in fact increased, this can be attributed to human influence, a prediction can be made that heatwaves will increase during the next ninety years as a result of anthropogenic global warming. The  ‘likelihood’ assigned to this is of 90-94%. Therefor according to the IPCC, confidence in the prediction is higher than confidence in either the observations or the hypothesis that the prediction is based on.

This makes no sense to me, but then I am not a scientist, let alone a climate scientist. It would be very interesting to hear the views of researchers from other disciplines, not on the merits of the scientific evidence, but as to whether this table does in fact defy logic.

Scanning the levels of ‘likelihood’ expressed in the rest of the table shows a remarkable consistency. The ‘likelihood’ expressed in Column [B]  is higher than that in Column [C], but Column [D] is higher than in Column [C]. In some instances the assessment of ‘likelihood’ in Column [D] is higher than in either Columns [B] or [C] . So in each case the IPCC are saying that they have greater confidence in the predictions than in the hypothesis on which it is based, and in some cases that confidence in the prediction is even higher  than in the observed trend.

The Working Group I  Summary for Policymakers is intended to present a transparent and objective assessment of whether anthropogenic global warming is taking place, and do so in a way that is accessible to laypeople who would be unable to draw their own conclusions from the thousands of pages of scientific references in the main report. To a great extent this requires that policy makers must trust the scientists who write the IPCC’s reports, and they are likely to do so. We are repeatedly assured that the IPCC’s findings are based on the most carefully reviewed scientific research and therefore there is no room for argument about the facts. This point of view is epitomised by the oft-repeated mantras, ‘the science is settled’ and ‘you can’t argue with the science’.

The take-away message for anyone reading Table SPM.2 is that the IPCC attaches a high level of confidence to predictions that anthropogenic warming will cause extreme weather events to increase during the current century. They do not need to add that droughts, floods, hurricanes and heat waves cause loss of life and wreak economic havoc and misery on those who experience them. Regular news converge of such events leaves us in no doubt about this. Such events are the most visible and dramatic symptoms of our restless climate and we are well aware of their consequences.

The IPCC’s message to policy makers is clear: reduce greenhouse gas emissions now or more people will get hurt, and it will be your fault. So it is very important that those who are in a position to allocate billions of pounds, dollars or euros to fighting global warming should be fully aware of the methodology that the IPCC is using to reach this conclusion, and particularly just what confidence can be placed in their predictions.

The footnote on Page 3 of the Working Group I Summary for Policymakers that describes how confidence in scientific understanding and predicted outcomes is assessed says this:

In this Summary for Policymakers, the following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood, using expert judgement, of an outcome or a result …
My emphasis

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf

Therefore the predictions of ‘likelihood’ in Table SPM.2 are not derived from any specific research contained in the assessment report but rely on the views of the authors of the report. So we are not talking about confidence levels that have been arrived at mathematically here, but the opinions of scientists. And reliance on their opinions is far reaching.

A minuscule footnote (f) to Table SPM.1 says:

Magnitude of anthropogenic contributions not assessed. Attribution for these phenomena based on expert judgement rather than formal attribution studies.

(see the original document for all the footnotes)

This refers to the predictions in Column [C] rows 3,4,6 and 7. It would appear that so far as these categories of extreme weather events are concerned there are no studies cited in the report that attribute human influence to the phenomena concerned, and the claims made in the table are based entirely on the ‘expert judgement’ of the authors.

Looking at the notes accompanying Table SPM.2 we find that it summarises the findings of Chapter 3 of the Working Group I section of the report: Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate Change . The coordinating lead authors of this chapter were Dr Kevin E Trenberth of National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), and Professor Phil Jones, at that time director of he Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia.

The CRU emails leaked on the internet before Christmas made Professor Jones the unwilling star of  what has been described as the biggest scientific scandal in living memory. He has now stepped down as director of the CRU pending inquiries into Climategate.

Dr Trenberth was also one of the correspondents featured in the Climategate emails and he has this to say (12/10/2009) in a message to Professor Michael Mann of Hockey Stick graph fame concerning the present decade long standstill in global warming;

Well I have my own article on where the heck is global warming? We are asking that here in Boulder … [Colorado, home to NCAR]
The fact is that we can’t account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a
travesty that we can’t. The CERES data published in the August BAMS 09 supplement on 2008 shows there should be even more warming: but the data are surely wrong. Our observing system is inadequate.

1255352257.txt

This suggests that Dr Trenberth’ reaction to observed data that fail to match predictions is to reconsider the observations rather than question the skill of the predictions; something that I think most research scientists would find alarming.

(This message was copied to Stephen H Schneider , Myles Allen , Peter Stott , Phil Jones , Benjamin Santer , Tom Wigley , Thomas R Karl , Gavin Schmidt , James Hansen  and Michael Oppenheimer. Although it is outside the scope of this post, it is worth noting that three of the recipients are involved in compiling global surface temperature records: Jones (CRU), Karl (NOAA), and Hansen (NASA GISS)).

In 2005 Dr Trenberth organised a major ‘media event’ at which he informed the world’s press that global warming was causing increased hurricane activity. This led to the resignation from the IPCC of hurricane expert Chris Landsea who was the contributing author responsible for the hurricanes section of Working Group I Chapter 3 of the Fourth Assessment Report. Prior to the press conference, Landsea warned Trenberth who was not a hurricane expert that there were no credible research findings that supported this view, but his warning was ignored. When Landsea complained to the governing council of the IPCC that making claims without sound scientific evidence would prejudice the organisation’s credibility their response was to defend Trenberth’s behaviour.

The extent of the scandal revealed by the CRU emails is beyond the scope of this post, but one quotation from a message written by Professor Jones would seem to be particularly relevant so far as the matter of ‘expert judgement’ is concerned:

As you know, I’m not political. If anything, I would like to see the climate change happen, so the science could be proved right, regardless of the consequences. This isn’t being political, it is being selfish.

1120593115.txt

Does this suggest a frame of mind in which one can reasonably expect a scientist to exercise his ‘expert judgement’ objectively? There is plenty of circumstantial evidence in the CRU emails suggesting that Jones may have behaved improperly both in connection with his own research and his contributions to the IPCC. Climategate, and Jones’ conduct, are now the subject of inquiries by both the University of East Anglia and The House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology.

As well as being the Coordinating Lead Authors on Working Group I Chapter 3, both Trenberth and Jones were Draft Contributing Authors for the Working Group 1 Summary for Policymakers. It is inconceivable that they would not have been involved in the creation and inclusion of Table SPM.2 in that summary.

One of the most worrying aspects of the flaws in the IPCC’s Working Group II report, which have already received so much publicity, is that they have only come to light because they were publicised by bloggers. As I said earlier in this post, I am not a scientist and there may be perfectly reasonable explanations for the apparent inconsistencies that Table SPM.2 reveals that I have missed. So far as I am aware there is no one involved with the IPCC who I can ask about this in the expectation of getting a fair and objective response. If the Working Group I report is to be scrutinised, then this  too is only likely to happen if bloggers persistently ask awkward questions.

At the beginning of this week Professor Jones gave evidence before the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee. Andrew Orlowski of The Register ended a very perceptive report of the proceedings by concluding that the committee may have come to the conclusion ‘that rotten scientists perhaps mean rotten science’.  At the time that the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report was published there was no one outside the sceptical bogosphere who was likely to entertain the idea that this vast and heavily hyped document might contain egregious errors. All that has changed now with the revelations concerning Working Group II. It is high time that the same detailed analysis is applied to the findings of Working Group I, the part of the report that is supposed to provide the real evidence for anthropogenic global warming. Furthermore, where the behaviour of scientists as revealed by Climategate is in doubt, their input  to the IPCC reports should be scrutinised, otherwise the IPCC’s claims that none of the revelations so far have weakened the essential evidence of anthropogenic global warming will be credible. The address headers of the CRU emails read like a list of the IPCC hierarchy.

Here is one last word about the IPCC use of ‘expert judgement’ in assessing the probability of scientific understanding and likelihood’s. The United Nations Environment Programme is one of the parent bodies of the IPCC, with the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). UNEP handled the publicity for the February 2007 press release of the Working Group I Summary for Polichymakers. This is the headline that they used:

Evidence of Human-caused Global Warming “Unequivocal”, says IPCC

UNEP Press Release

The media worldwide dutifully ran headlines and stories that said exactly that, but the term ‘unequivocal’ only appears once in the Summary for Policymakers in the following context:

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal …

AR4 SPM

The supposed human contribution to this warming, which amount to significantly less than 1oC is assessed as ‘very likely’, which falls a long way short of ‘unequivocal’, so it appears that UNEP were prepared to ‘sex up’ this report from the outset.

In the IPCC’s Third Assesment  Report, published in 2001, the probability that humans are contributing to climate change was assessed as ‘likely’. It would be very interesting to know whose ‘expert judgement’ led to the probability being increased to ‘very likely’ in 2007, and on what considerations this decision was based.

62 Responses to “Phil Jones and the ‘expert judgement’ of the IPCC”

  1. TonyN correctly points out that, because current criticism is confined to IPCC AR4 WG II, AGW proponents have been able to claim that core AGW science is unscathed. His focus on WG I, and especially Table SPM. 2, exposes the weakness of that claim. But I think that the particular emphasis he and most commentators here put on the IPCC’s having more confidence in its predictions (Column [D]) than its observations (Column [B]), although clearly important in exposing the inadequacy of the IPCC’s analysis, misses what is really the main point. That, I suggest, resides in Column [C].

    The cornerstone of the AGW proponents’ position is the assumption that man-made GHG emissions are the cause of global warming and thus of dangerous climate change. Therefore, when Ban Ki-Moon says, in launching the “independent” review of the IPCC, that “nothing that has been alleged or revealed in the media recently alters the fundamental scientific consensus on climate change”, most observers will understand his underlying assumption to be that the consensus is that man is responsible for climate change.

    That’s the alarmist “narrative”. And I believe that, by focusing on the flaws in the IPCC’s WG I projections, contributors to this thread are in danger of letting the alarmists get away with it. That’s why I disagree with Potentilla (#25) when he urges “more elaboration on the future projections”.

    The alarmist position is epitomised by an email sent recently to Benny Peiser by retired paleoclimatologist William Ruddiman. He says:

    I am sorry to see your stream of posts about ‘global cooling’ coming to an end, no doubt because of the inconvenient rebound of global temperature in 2009. I had really been enjoying watching your global-coolers embarrass themselves. To mainstream scientists like me, the reasoning behind their arguments fall far below that of the average 7-year-old. If your readers doubt this, ask them to find the nearest available 7-year-old, show him or her a plot of global temperature for the last 100-150 years, and ask 6 questions:

    1. Did the overall temperature trend in the last 125 years go down or up?
    2. Were there times when the upward trend levelled out or went down?
    3. Afterward, did temperatures warm to levels even higher than before?
    4. Do the last 5 or so years show a small cooling trend?
    5. Does this recent cooling trend differ in any obvious way from the earlier ones?
    6. Do you think the upward warming trend is likely to resume in the future? (see below)

    The answers to the first 5 questions are obvious: up, yes, yes, yes, and no. So question 6 is the key. It requires the child to look at the record of past temperature changes, think about the lessons learned (a tiny bit!, but more than your global coolers), and draw a simple conclusion.

    So – how did your nearest available 7-year-old respond? I doubt that he/she would find the recent cooling different in any obvious way from the range of several previous ones. If so, this 7-year-old judged that the long-term warming trend will resume and will likely reach even higher levels (as it seems to have begun to do in 2009). And if so, your nearest available child understands natural climatic variability far better than you.

    This ignores the real issue: is recent global warming man-made? Ruddiman appears not even to realise it is an issue. Yet his is an approach routinely adopted in Government statements, MSM reports etc. From there, it’s a short step to promoting the false impression that the sceptics’ position is to deny the world is warming. And, as Ruddiman demonstrates, that’s a position easily shown to be invalid. It’s a classic, and well often executed, strawman tactic.

    But WG I shows that the man-made global warming assumption is based on the flimsiest science – see my posts 6 and 23. At post 43, Craig Goodrich wrote, “… the only chapter of real importance is Chapter 9”. I agree, although Chapter 8 (see especially 8.6.3 and 8.6.4) is also relevant. So, to restate my opening comment: this thread’s focus on the inadequacy of analysis supporting IPCC predictions misses what is the critically important main point.

  2. Robin:

    You are undoubtedly right in what you say, unlike Ruddiman who seems not to have asked himself why convincing a seven-year-old is easier than convincing an informed sceptic.

    The problem with both your take on SPM.2 and mine is that it’s not easy to present the arguments in a way that will wow the average reader of a middle-brow paper, or even those who read the broadsheets. Yet these points, IMHO, are more significant in assessing the work of the designated climate assessors than anything that has been found in WGII

  3. Robin

    You make a valid point (52) when you state that the key weakness of AR4 WG1 is the premise of human cause for the observed changes in our climate.

    This is, of course, compounded by the many exaggerations, errors and outright falsehoods in the AR4 WG1 and SPM 2007 reports, as compiled in the excellent summary by PaulM.

    I believe that it is important to highlight these, so that one and all can see that it is not only the WG2 report that is basically flawed, as has most recently been demonstrated, but also the underlying WG1 report. The argumentation here is clear and crisp: data have been manipulated to prove a point.

    But back to the anthropogenic argument, which is a bit harder to explain to an interested observer.

    IPCC implicates anthropogenic causes by default, i.e. an argument going something like “our computer models can only recreate the late 20th century warming when we program in anthropogenic forcing”.

    This is a hollow argument for several reasons.

    1. it does not explain the early 20th century and late 19th century warming cycles, which were (as Phil Jones has conceded to the BBC) not statistically different from the late 20th century warming cycle, yet cannot be explained by the models
    2. it assumes that all natural forcing factors were essentially negligible, which is being directly refuted by the most recent cooling despite record CO2 increase

    In Table SPM.2. it is precisely “column B”, which is the weakest, as you have pointed out.

    This column ranks the “likelihood of a human contribution” to the observed recent climate trends at >50% for five “severe weather” phenomena and >66% for two “non-severe warming” phenomena, with the disclaimer that the “likelihood” of this possible “human contribution” was not established by “formal attribution studies”, but only by “expert judgment”.

    This is an extremely lame argument in support of a human cause for the observed warming as well as the weather trends attributed to this warming.

    For this reason I would say that, while there are many errors and exaggerations in the IPCC reports, the weakest part of the IPCC argument is that of human attribution, which lies precisely in its WG1 report and is key to the whole AGW premise.

    Max

  4. Robin/Max:

    Judith Curry throws some light on the origin of the estimates in Column C:

    The IPCC concluded that most of the warming of the latter 20th century was very likely caused by humans. Well, as far as I know, that conclusion was mostly a negotiation, in terms of calling it “likely” or “very likely.” Exactly what does “most” mean? What percentage of the warming are we actually talking about? More than 50 percent? A number greater than 50 percent?

  5. I think that we will hear a lot more about that Curry interview.

    There seems to be a trend developing for ordinary, respectable, mainstream climate scientists to speak out, and I do not think that the dogma (or the IPCC) will be able to withstand that. It is what so many of us have been dreaming about for years and for every scientist who puts their head above the parapet there will be encouragement for others to follow suit.

  6. potentilla:

    I see little connection between Dr Curry’s comment and Column C. There’s much to say about the latter but the outstanding issue is surely that it refers, not to human causation, but to human “contribution”. Why choose such a vague word? It could logically mean a human input of a mere 1% (or even less): if I pay 20P towards your £200 birthday gift, I’ve contributed but I certainly haven’t paid for it. It clearly means that the authors of Table SPM.2 were very uncertain about the man-made component of global warming. And don’t forget their use of “likely” and “more likely than not” means they weren’t sure there was a even a contribution.

    So much for the much quoted “consensus” on human causation.

    But Dr Curry is right to focus on “most”. As she indicates, it could mean as little as 51%. To my mind, the IPCC’s use of “most” negates the oft-asserted claim that AR4 supports the view that mankind is responsible for global warming. And that’s without taking the remarkable SPM.2 into account.

    As for the negotiation about “likely” or “very likely” (oh yes, that’s science at its very best), I suggest the real motivation of the authors of the WG I Summary is exhibited by the second sentence of the notorious “Most of the observed increase …” paragraph. It says “This is an advance since the TAR’s conclusion that ‘most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations'”. Why on earth use the word “advance”? Change maybe – difference perhaps. But “advance” – it can only mean that the authors welcome their (newly negotiated) ability to assert that those wicked humans are even worse than they last thought.

  7. I said at post 51 that “The cornerstone of the AGW proponents’ position is the assumption that man-made GHG emissions are the cause of global warming and thus of dangerous climate change”. This BBC opinion piece by Chris Smith, the UK Environment Secretary, is another fine example. He claims “That evidence shows overwhelmingly that our emissions of greenhouse gases are having a serious impact on the Earth’s atmosphere, and that – as a result – climate change is happening and will accelerate”. So what is this “evidence”? Well, says Chris Smith, “we can see with our own eyes that climatic, weather and temperature trends are changing …” And that’s it – not a beep about evidence that man’s GHG emissions are the cause. Yet the BBC’s introduction happily says that “he stresses the soundness of the fundamental climate science”. No, he doesn’t – but the BBC seems not to notice.

  8. I’ve received an email from Doug Keenan reminding me that at least part of his submission to the HoC Select Committee may be relevant to this post as it concerns Jones’ conduct as one of the Coordinated Lead Authors on AR4 WGI Chapter 3. Have a look at Section 3 here:

    http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/memo/climatedata/uc4602.htm

  9. TonyN

    The Keenan memorandum you cited is quite critical of Jones with regard to the fabricated Chinese temperature data, false claims regarding the impacts of urbanization and the IPCC process in general.

    Keenan’s last remarks are particularly strong:

    there is evidence that Jones abused his position of responsibility for the IPCC chapter to cite his own research (in support of global warming) and ignore other research that contradicted his.

    Jones is more unscrupulous than the foregoing indicates. Simply put, Jones is an incompetent who has advanced himself by joining what is in effect a mutual benefit society.

    Ouch!

    Max

  10. actually it is not that hard to setup wind farms, the only problem is that it requires lots of capital investment.;:,

  11. our hometown already have wind farms and it is great to know that we have a reneawable electricity source,;`

    [This is probably rather ingenious spam, TonyN]

  12. Biotin side effects writes

    our hometown already have wind farms and it is great to know that we have a reneawable electricity source,

    Great!

    What does your “hometown” do the 60% of the time when the wind is not blowing or blowing too hard for the wind farms to operate safely?

    Turn out the lights?

    Hmmm… I hardly believe so.

    Rely on a backup system, fueled by more reliable fossil fuels (or possibly nuclear generation)?

    More likely.

    And I’m sure it’s “great to know” that you have this backup to your windmills to cover the 60% of the time that they are standing idle.

    Max

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